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Abstract
This article studies how relative performance concerns affect institutional in-
vestors’ information choices in the context of a multi-security market. I show
that due to relative performance concerns and learning capacity constraint,
institutional investors tend to acquire the same piece of information and the
same asset as their peers. I also show that the change of distribution of ca-
pacity constraint can affect the price efficiency and cost of capital, but only
through its effect on investors’ average capacity constraint.
Keywords: relative performance concerns, attention allocation,
complementarities in information acquisition
1. Introduction
”Institutions are herding animals. We watch the same indicators and lis-
ten to the same prognostications. Like lemmings, we tend to move in the
same direction and at the same time.”
Wall Street Journal,17 Oct 1989
Empirical evidence suggests that institutional investors tend to buy and
sell the same stocks at the same time (see, among others, Bikhchandani and
Sharma (2000), Hirshleifer and Hong Teoh (2003), Choi and Sias (2009), Sias
(2004) for the evidence of institutional herding). There are several poten-
tial reasons for institutional herding.1In this article, I identify an additional
1For an overview of theoretical research on rational herd behavior in financial markets,
see Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) and Hirshleifer and Hong Teoh (2003).
channel though which institutional investors herd. By incorporating relative
performance concerns into a rational expectations equilibrium model with
rational inattention, I show how such payoff externalities can give merit to
the quotation above, that is, complementarities in information acquisition
and hence, herding on a particular asset or asset class.
I study the effect of relative performance concerns by extending the mod-
el developed by Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010). In particular, I
take the relative performance contract as given, in which an institutional
investor’s marginal utility of realized trading profits increases in the average
realized trading profits of the other investors in the economy. I focus on a
three-period, noisy rational expectations equilibrium with independent asset-
s and independent signals and assume that investors have entropy learning
technology so they have to choose to learn about specific assets or to allocate
his capacity to all assets in the first stage. After allocating his capacity, every
agent receives the signal and chooses optimal portfolio in the second stage.
In the third stage, institutional investors
There are several reasons why institutional investors may have to take
relative performance concerns into consideration. First, individual investors
usually base their investment decision on the relative past performance of
funds.2 Second, as is well known from contract theory (Holmstrom (1982)),
relative performance-based contracts may mitigate agency problems.3
I show that there exists a linear noisy rational expectations equilibrium
in the second stage. In the first stage, institutional investors are faced with
information processing capacity which bounds the distance between priors
and posteriors variance-covariance matrix so they use their capacity to learn
from prices and signals. Then I show that there is strategic complementarities
in information choice. This is in contrast with the indifference result in
Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010), that investors who have CARA
utility functions are indifferent about how to allocating the capacity. So this
paper provides another explanation to the herd on particular information
and hence, herd on particular assets.
The intuition for the result is the following. If more people choose to
learn more about the payoff of asset j, they will also hold more shares of
2See, among others, Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Palomino (2005) and Sirri and Tufano
(1998).
3See Gu¨mbel (2005).
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asset j because the variance is reduced by learning. Agent i, due to relative
performance concerns, also want to hold more asset j, which result in raising
the value of learning the asset. As a result, agent i also want to learn more
about the asset.
I also investigate how the distribution of capacity constraint will change
the price efficiency and, as a result, the cost of capital. I conclude that if the
average N th root of capacity is the same, where N is the number of assets,
the distribution will not affect the price efficiency and the cost of capital.
In particular, given the average of N th root of capacity, the inequality of
capacity constraints among investors does not matter for price efficiency.
If some agents have low capacity and other agents have high capacity, it is
obvious that some agents will have little information about assets’ payoff and
other agents have much more information about assets’ payoff. My conclusion
is that the information asymmetry will not affect the cost of capital and price
efficiency, given the mean of N th root of capacity constraint.
This article is related to several strands of literature. First, it is related
to relative performance concerns and herding. Gu¨mbel (2005) explores the
optimal design of compensation contract between an investor and his agent,
showing that investors herd in their asset allocation decision when the cost
of information is high and managers are sufficiently risk averse. Maug and
Naik (1996) examines the circumstances under which the fund managers
decide to acquire the same information as their peer, who only learn and
trade in one asset. . Whereas they derive the optimal contract which gives
rise to herding behavior in the framework of Kyle (1985). This paper’s focus
is not on optimal contract and I incorporate relative performance concerns
into the framework of Admati (1985), taking the optimal contract as given. I
conclude that herding may rise because fund managers choose to learn similar
information simultaneously due to relative performance objectives.
There are many papers that produce complementarities on information
acquisition. In a static environment, Froot et al. (1992), Barlevy and Veronesi
(2007), Garcia and Strobl (2011) and Veldkamp (2006) among others generate
information complementarities.4 Avdis (2012) and Hellwig and Veldkamp
(2009) obtain complementarities in a dynamic setting. This article is different
from these papers in that I incorporate relative performance concerns and
information learning capacity in a noisy rational expectations equilibrium.
4See Avdis (2012) for a review of mechanisms in a static environment.
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As a result, agents have to decide which assets to learn under the learning
constraint. Our model and the one in Garcia and Strobl (2011) both assume
that the information acquisition cost is a nonpecuniary cost, but the cost in
Garcia and Strobl (2011) is the same for all agents, while our model allows
for heterogeneous capacity constraint. Garcia and Strobl (2011) supposes
that investors choose to acquire information or not according to how many
other investors pay to acquire information. Our paper can be viewed as a
multi-asset extension of Garcia and Strobl (2011) where investors choose to
allocate learning capacity according to other investors’ choices.
The existing model closest to ours is that of Van Nieuwerburgh and Veld-
kamp (2009). They investigate how precisely a signal an investor wants
to observe about each asset’s payoff when there is a constraint on the to-
tal amount of signal precision he can observe. Mondria (2010) models the
interplay between the attention allocation of portfolio investors and price
comovement. This article differs from this literature in that I examine the
consequences that relative performance concerns have on information choice.
In contrast to the indifference results in the Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp
(2009), our model predicts that with CARA preferences and entropy learning
technology, investors’ information choice is complementary with the average
precision. What’s more, while Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) fo-
cuses on the partial equilibrium so agents ignore the information included in
the price, I consider the noisy rational expectations equilibrium with CARA
utility function so agents will learn from price.
This article is also related to the literature that studies relative wealth
concerns. Abel (1990) and Gali (1994) consider the effects of consumption
externalities on asset pricing and portfolio choice. Gali (1994) concludes that
positive externalities (0 < γ < 1) tend to reduce the size of the equity premi-
um investors require to absorb the entire equity supply because the optimal
individual risky share will increase. I get similar results in noisy rational ex-
pectations model. As is stated by Garcia and Strobl (2011), investors hedge
the relative wealth risk by imitating the average portfolio. As a result, the
demand shift will decrease the price and hence, the risk premium. Like ours,
Andrei (2010) uses the standard Admati (1985) model to investigate the in-
teraction between relative wealth concerns and information advantage and
propose a new mechanism to explain home bias.
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The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the model with emphasis on information leaning. Section 3 describes the
equilibrium at the second stage and agent’s optimal information choice ac-
cording to average precision. Section 4 presents an extension of our model.
I introduce the heterogeneous capacity constraints and demonstrate the ef-
fect of inequality of capacity constraints on the market efficiency. Section 5
summarizes our contribution and concludes.
2. The Model
This paper studies a three-period economy and there is a continuum of
investors. In period 1, institutional investors make decisions as to the preci-
sion of signals about asset payoffs, subject to limited information-processing
capacity. In period 2, the agents observe signals and then choose what assets
to purchase. In period 3, agents receive the asset payoffs and realize their
utility. I extend the multiple asset rational expectations model developed by
Admati (1985) to allow for externalities. In particular, I assume that agents
care not only about their own wealth, but also about their peers’.
2.1. Information Sets
I assume that all random variables belong to a linear space of jointly
normally distributed random variables. In particular, I assume that there
are N risky assets and they pay off f. All investors are endowed with a prior
belief that f ∼ N(µ,Σ). At time 1, agent i chooses how to allocate his
information capacity by choosing the signal variance Σi where ηi = f + ei is
the signal and ei ∼ N(0,Σi). So the signal is noisy but unbiased. At time 2,
agent i combines his signal , the price and his prior belief, using Bayes’law.
Let µˆi and Σ̂i be the posterior mean and variance of payoffs , conditional on
all information known to the investor in period 2:
µˆi ≡ E[f |µ, ηi, p] (1)
= (Σ−1 + Σ−1i + Σ
−1
p )
−1(Σ−1µ+ Σ−1i ηi + Σ
−1
p E[f |p]), (2)
Σ̂i ≡ V ar[f |µ, η, p] = (Σ−1 + Σ−1i + Σ−1p )−1, (3)
where Σp = V ar[f |p].
Following Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010), investor i is faced
with information processing constraint: |Σ|/|Σ̂i| ≤ Ki.
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2.2. Preferences and Assets
I assume that investor i has preferences of the form
Ui = −exp(−τ(Wi − γW¯ )). (4)
I study a competitive market which is populated by a continuum of agents,
indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. There are N+1 assets in the market: a riskless asset in
perfectly elastic supply with a price normalized to 1 and the payoff is R. The
aggregate supply of the risky asset is random and equals x + x¯ where x ∼
N(0, σ2xI). To simplify our analysis, I assume that the assets are independent,
so the payoff variance-covariance matrix is diagonal. I also assume that Σ
and Σi for all i are diagonal.
2.3. Definition of Equilibrium
2.3.1. The Second Stage
Given the signals, a rational expectation equilibrium is characterized by
a set of trading strategies qi where i ∈ [0, 1], and a price function P such that
(1).Each agent i chooses her trading strategy qi so as to maximize her
expected utility conditional on her information set Fi, i.e., qi solves
maxE[−exp(−τ(Wi − γW¯ ))|Fi], i ∈ [0, 1]. (5)
(2).Markets clear, i.e., ∫ 1
0
qi = x+ x¯. (6)
2.3.2. The First Stage
Knowing the utility in the second stage for different signals and other
investors’ signal precision choice, investor i makes the optimal information
choice Σ̂i such that
max
Σ̂i
E[E[Ui|Fi]], (7)
s.t.|Σ|/|Σ̂i| ≤ Ki. (8)
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3. Characterization of Equilibrium
In this section I solve for the equilibrium defined above by backward in-
duction, starting with the optimal portfolio decision. In period 2, investors
have three pieces of information which aggregate to form the conditional
expectation of the assets’ payoffs: the prior beliefs, the signals and the equi-
librium price.
Proposition 1. There exists a rational expectations equilibrium price
p =
1
R
(A+Bf + Cx), (9)
where
A = [Σ−1 +
ψ′ψ
ρ2σ2x
+ (1− γ)ψ]−1[Σ−1µ− (1− γ)ρx¯], (10)
B = [Σ−1 +
ψ′ψ
ρ2σ2x
+ (1− γ)ψ]−1[(1− γ)ψ + ψ
′ψ
ρ2σ2x
], (11)
C = −[Σ−1 + ψ
′ψ
ρ2σ2x
+ (1− γ)ψ]−1[(1− γ)ρI + ψ
′
ρσ2x
], (12)
and ψ =
∫ 1
0
Σ−1i di.
Proof is in appendix.
Remark: The equilibrium price is reduced to the one in Garcia and Strobl
(2011) where there is only one risky asset.
The price is also a function of the posterior mean and variance of the
“average” investor. Let
Σ̂−1a ≡ Σ−1 +
ψ′ψ
ρ2σ2x
+ (1− γ)ψ, (13)
µˆa ≡ [Σ−1 + ψ
′ψ
ρ2σ2x
+ (1− γ)ψ]−1[Σ−1µ+ (1− γ)ψf + ψ
′ψ
ρ2σ2x
(f − ψ−1ρx)].(14)
Then (9) can be written as pR = µˆa−ρΣ̂a(1−γ)(x+ x¯), where µˆa and Σ̂a
can be interpreted as the “average” posterior mean and variance, respectively.
The price of the asset is equal to the average posterior mean minus a discount
that result from the risk the market associates with holding all the supply
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of risky assets. ρΣ̂a(1 − γ)x¯ is the cost of capital which comports with the
definition in Easley and O’hara (2004) and Lambert et al. (2012).
In Gali (1994), positive consumption externalities tend to reduce the size
of the equity premium investors require to absorb the entire supply. Here I
get similar result that the relative wealth concerns makes the effective supply
decrease to (1− γ)(x+ x¯).
An interesting result is that with relative performance concerns, the “av-
erage” posterior variance Σ̂a is different from the“real” average posterior
variance
∫ 1
0
Σ̂−1i di,
Σ−1 +
ψ′ψ
ρ2σ2x
+ (1− γ)ψ <
∫ 1
0
Σ̂−1i di, (15)
as long as γ 6= 0, where Σ̂−1i = Σ−1 + Σ−1i + ψ
′ψ
ρ2σ2x
.
Also, the information content of prices is independent of γ, i.e., V ar[f |p] =
( 1
σ2xρ
2ψ
′ψ)−1. The results are summarized in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1. The relative performance concern, denoted as γ, alters the cost
of capital in two different ways. It reduces the effective supply of assets and
increase the average posterior variance. Given ψ, γ has no effect on price
efficiency.
The optimal portfolio choice of agent i is given in the appendix. It can
be rearranged as
qi =
Σ̂−1i (µˆi − pR)
ρ
+ γ(x+ C−1Bf) + γx¯− γC−1BpR.
x + C−1Bf is the information about the supply of assets agent i get from
the equilibrium prices. The higher the x+ C−1Bf , the more shares agent i
want to buy. It can be viewed as the herding effect. Agent i would deviate
from the standard portfolio choice and buy what other people are buying
because he will suffer more from lagging behind other institutional investors
than beating them.
The period-2 expected utility is
E[Ui|Fi] = −E[exp(−τ(Wi − γW¯ ))|Fi]]
= −|I − 2Σ̂i(−ργC−1B)|− 12 exp(−1
2
(µˆi − pR)′Σ̂−1i (µˆi − pR)).
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By standard results from statistics, if X and Y are arbitrary random variables
for which the necessary expectations and variance exist, then V ar(Y ) =
E[V ar(Y |X)] + V ar(E[Y |X]). As a result,
µˆi − pR ∼ N((I −B)µ− A, VER), (16)
where
VER = V ar(f − pR)− V ar(f − pR|Fi)
= V ar(f −Bf + Cx)− V ar(f |Fi)
= (I −B)Σ(I −B)′ + σ2xCC ′ − Σ̂i
= Σ +BΣB′ − 2ΣB′ − Σ̂i + σ2xCC ′. (17)
Let Q = Σ + BΣB′ − 2ΣB′ + σ2xCC ′, then VER = Q − Σ̂i. By standard
results from statistics, if X ∈ Rn is a normally distributed random vector
with mean ϑ and covariance matrix Ω and I − 2ΩAo is positive definite, so
E[exp(XTAoX + bT)] is well-defined and is given by
E[exp(X ′AoX + b′X)] = |I − 2ΩAo|− 12 exp
(
b′ϑ+ ϑ′Aoϑ
+
1
2
(b+ 2Aoϑ)′ × (I − 2ΩAo)−1Ω(b+ 2Aoϑ)
)
.
Using the previous result about the expectation of the exponential func-
tion and the definition of VER, the period-1 expected utility is
E[E[Ui|Fi]] = −|I − 2Σ̂i(−ργC−1B)|− 12 |I − 2VER(−1
2
Σ̂−1i )|−
1
2
× exp
(
−1
2
((I −B)µ− A)′Σ̂−1i × ((I −B)µ− A)
+
1
2
((I −B)µ− A)′ × Σ̂−1i (I + VERΣ̂−1i )−1VERΣ̂−1i ((I −B)µ− A)
)
.
Noting that
Σ̂−1i (I + VERΣ̂
−1
i )
−1VERΣ̂−1i − Σ̂−1i = Σ̂−1i (I + (Q− Σ̂i)Σ̂−1i )−1(Q− Σ̂i)Σ̂−1i − Σ̂−1i
= Σ̂−1i (Q− Σ̂i)Σ̂−1i − Σ̂−1i
= Q−1(Q− Σ̂i)Σ̂−1i − Σ̂−1i
= −Q−1.
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As a result,
E[E[Ui|Fi]] = −|I − 2Σ̂i(−ργC−1B)|− 12 |I − 2VER(−12Σ̂−1i )|−
1
2
× exp (−1
2
((I −B)µ− A)′Q−1((I −B)µ− A)) .
Then agent i’s period-1 information choice problem can be written as
max−|I − 2Σ̂i(−ργC−1B)|− 12 |I − 2VER(−1
2
Σ̂−1i )|−
1
2 . (18)
Substitute −ρC−1B = ψ and VER = (Q− Σ̂i) into (18) yields,
max |Σ̂−1i − 2γψ|. (19)
Given the entropy capacity constraint in (8), the solution to the capacity
allocation problem is indeterminate.
Proposition 2. When the amount of capacity K an investor is endowed with
limits how much his signal η can reduce payoff uncertainty as |Σ|/|Σ̂i| ≤ K,
the investor who has no relative performance concerns is indifferent between
any allocation of his capacity.
Proof. When γ = 0, the object reduces to |Σ̂−1i |. When Σ is exogenous, the
object depends only on the capacity K, not on how that capacity is allocated
across assets.
Note that the proposition is consistent with the “indifferent results” in
Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009). However, Van Nieuwerburgh and
Veldkamp (2009) get the result in a partial equilibrium while I get the result
in the noisy rational expectation equilibrium.
According to Veldkamp (2011), indifference arises because the desire for
specialization and diversification just offset each other. On one hand, when
many investors learn about asset j, the equilibrium price of j contains more
information of asset j. If agent i choose also to learn about asset j, the
portfolio choice in period 2 is much harder to predict on the basis of time-1
information. However, the CARA investors are averse to the time-1 portfolio
uncertainty. On the other hand, as more investors choose to learn about asset
j, more information is revealed by the equilibrium price, the uncertainty is
reduced and agent i would choose to hold more asset j. As a result, devoting
capacity to asset j becomes more valuable. When CARA investors are faced
with entropy constraint, they are indifferent between any allocation of their
capacity.
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Proposition 3. When the agent has relative performance concerns, indiffer-
ent result is violated and investors’ information choices are complementary.
That is, when there are more investors learning about asset j, other investors
also want to learn about asset j.
Proof. When there are only two assets, the problem is greatly simplified. In
this situation, Σ =
(
Σ11 0
0 Σ22
)
, Σi =
(
Σ11i 0
0 Σ22i
)
. Define Σiiψ where
i=1,2 such that ψ =
(
1
Σ11ψ
0
0 1
Σ22ψ
)
. The capacity constraint can be written
as Σ11Σ22/Σ̂11i Σ̂
22
i = K , which equals to(
1 +
Σ11
Σ11i
+
Σ11
ρ2σ2x(Σ
11
ψ )
2
)(
1 +
Σ22
Σ22i
+
Σ22
ρ2σ2x(Σ
22
ψ )
2
)
= K, (20)
because Σ̂i = [Σ
−1 + Σ−1i + (
1
ρ2σ2x
ψ′ψ)]−1
Then
Σ̂i =
(
1
Σ11
+ 1
Σ11i
+ 1
ρ2σ2x(Σ
11
ψ )
2 0
0 1
Σ22
+ 1
Σ22i
+ 1
ρ2σ2x(Σ
22
ψ )
2
)−1
(21)
=
 Σ11Σ11i ρ2σ2x(Σ11ψ )2Σ11+Σ11i +ρ2σ2x(Σ11ψ )2 0
0
Σ22Σ22i ρ
2σ2x(Σ
22
ψ )
2
Σ22+Σ22i +ρ
2σ2x(Σ
22
ψ )
2
 . (22)
The objective is rewritten as the following equation
|Σ̂−1i − 2γψ|
=
∣∣∣∣∣
1
Σ11
+ 1
Σ11i
+ 1
ρ2σ2x(Σ
11
ψ )
2 − 2γΣ11ψ 0
0 1
Σ22
+ 1
Σ22i
+ 1
ρ2σ2x(Σ
22
ψ )
2 − 2γΣ22ψ
∣∣∣∣∣
=
(
1
Σ11
+
1
Σ11i
+
1
ρ2σ2x(Σ
11
ψ )
2
− 2γ
Σ11ψ
)(
1
Σ22
+
1
Σ22i
+
1
ρ2σ2x(Σ
22
ψ )
2
− 2γ
Σ22ψ
)
=
(
1 +
Σ11
Σ11i
+
Σ11
ρ2σ2x(Σ
11
ψ )
2
− 2γ
Σ11ψ
Σ11
)(
1 +
Σ22
Σ22i
+
Σ22
ρ2σ2x(Σ
22
ψ )
2
− 2γ
Σ22ψ
Σ22
)
1
Σ11Σ22
.
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So agent i’s problem is equivalent to
min
Σ11i ,Σ
22
i
(
1 +
Σ11
Σ11i
+
Σ11
ρ2σ2x(Σ
11
ψ )
2
)
2γ
Σ22ψ
Σ22 +
(
1 +
Σ22
Σ22i
+
Σ22
ρ2σ2x(Σ
22
ψ )
2
)
2γ
Σ11ψ
Σ11
under the constraint (21). Simple calculations show that(
1 +
Σ11
Σ11i
+
Σ11
ρ2σ2x(Σ
11
ψ )
2
)
=
√
K
Σ22ψ Σ
11
Σ11ψ Σ
22
. (23)
Similarly, (
1 +
Σ22
Σ22i
+
Σ22
ρ2σ2x(Σ
22
ψ )
2
)
=
√
K
Σ11ψ Σ
22
Σ22ψ Σ
11
. (24)
Substitute (23) and (24) into (22),
Σ̂i =

√
K
Σ22ψ
Σ11ψ Σ
22Σ11
0
0
√
K
Σ11ψ
Σ22ψ Σ
11Σ22

−1
. (25)
When there are N risky assets, define Σjjψ in a similar way and agent i
wants to
max
∏N
j=1
(
1 + Σ
jj
Σjji
+ Σ
jj
ρ2σ2x(Σ
jj
ψ )
2
− 2γΣjj
Σjjψ
)
, (26)
s.t.
∏N
j=1
(
1 + Σ
jj
Σjji
+ Σ
jj
ρ2σ2x(Σ
jj
ψ )
2
)
= K. (27)
Use the Lagrange method and some simple calculations show that
1 +
Σjj
Σjji
+
Σjj
ρ2σ2x(Σ
jj
ψ )
2
=
2γΣjj
Σjjψ
(
K∏N
j=1 aj
) 1
N
, (28)
where aj =
2γΣjj
Σjjψ
. Then
Σ̂jj−1i =
K
1
N
Σjjψ
(
N∏
j=1
Σjjψ
Σjj
) 1
N
. (29)
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So it is clear that when there are two assets, the precision of agent i about
the first asset , denoted as (Σ̂11i )
−1, equals to
√
K
Σ22ψ
Σ11ψ Σ
22Σ11
and is increasing
in 1
Σ11ψ
and decreasing in 1
Σ22ψ
, as is stated in (25). When there are N risky
assets, similar results can be derived from (29).
The optimal response of agent i’s information choice to the average infor-
mation choice is complementary. It can be viewed as a multi-asset general-
ization of Garcia and Strobl (2011), where the marginal value of information
is increasing in the number of agents who acquire information so there are
complementarities in information acquisition. When there are multiple asset-
s, agents have to choose to optimally allocate the capacity, which depends on
other agents choice. If more fund managers or other institutional investors
choose to allocate more capacity in the first asset, due to relative perfor-
mance concerns, agent i should also learn more about the payoff of the first
asset.
The intuition is that if most people choose to learn more about the payoff
of asset j, they will also hold more shares of asset j because the variance
is reduced by learning. Agent i, due to relative performance concerns, also
want to hold more asset j, which result in raising the value of learning the
asset. As a result, agent i also want to learn more about the asset. The effect
of herding, combined with the effect of information revelation, dominates the
effect of aversion to time-1 uncertainty.
Note that the precision of the signal is increasing in the capacity, as
in (23), (24) and (29). The result is consistent with the one derived by
Peress (2004), that studies the relationship between wealth and information
acquisition. Peress (2004) shows that demand for information is increasing
with wealth. However, Peress (2004) assumes that absolute risk aversion is
decreasing with wealth, while I assume CARA utility and impose capacity
constraint instead of wealth and the cost of information.
4. Distribution of Capacity and Price Efficiency
A natural question is how the distribution of capacity of information
acquisition will affect the information efficiency of the price. Hellwig (1980)
states that price aggregates the disperse information possessed by agents,
while the stochastic supply of assets prevents prices from fully revealing the
13
payoff f. The information content of prices is given by var[f |p]−1 = Σ−1 +
1
ρ2σ2x
ψ′ψ. When there are only two assets, ψ =
(
1
Σ11ψ
0
0 1
Σ22ψ
)
, where
1
Σ11ψ
=
∫ 1
0
Σ11i di, (30)
1
Σ22ψ
=
∫ 1
0
Σ22i di. (31)
Integrating (23) and (24) over all agents yields(
1 +
Σ11
Σ11ψ
+
Σ11
ρ2σ2x(Σ
11
ψ )
2
)
=
√
Σ22ψ Σ
11
Σ11ψ Σ
22
∫ 1
0
√
Kidi, (32)(
1 +
Σ22
Σ22ψ
+
Σ22
ρ2σ2x(Σ
22
ψ )
2
)
=
√
Σ11ψ Σ
22
Σ22ψ Σ
11
∫ 1
0
√
Kidi. (33)
When there are N risky assets, integrating (28) over all agents yields
1 +
Σjj
Σjjψ
+
Σjj
ρ2σ2x(Σ
jj
ψ )
2
=
Σjj
Σjjψ
(
N∏
j=1
Σjjψ
Σjj
) 1
N ∫ 1
0
N
√
Kidi. (34)
The results above are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. The distribution of capacity K will influence the informa-
tion content of the price and cost of capital, but only through the mean of
the N th root of each agents’ capacity, i.e., N
√
Ki. If the distribution of the
capacity is changed but the mean of the N th of capacity remain unchanged,
the information content of price and cost of capital would stay the same.
Note that the information content of the price is independent of the co-
efficient γ, which is consistent with the information content of prices given
by Garcia and Strobl (2011).
Proposition 4 states that given
∫ 1
0
N
√
Kidi, the change of distribution of K
would not affect Σψ, and hence, can not affect the stock price. The result is
in contrast with the conclusion in Peress (2004) which says the more unequal
the distribution of wealth, the higher the stock price.
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5. Conclusion
This paper investigates the effects of relative performance concerns on
information acquisition when there are multiple assets and a constraint on
the total amount of signal precision each investors can observe. I extend the
multiple asset model developed by Admati (1985) to allow for externalities
and derive a one-period, noisy rational expectations equilibrium with inde-
pendent assets and independent signals. With entropy learning technology,
I show that investors’ choices of learning are complementary. As a result,
investors choose similar asset portfolios. So I propose a theoretical explana-
tion of the phenomenon that institution investors follow each other into and
out of the same securities.
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
I speculate that the equilibrium price takes the form pR = D + Bf +
C(x+x). Then for agent i, Wi−γW¯ = q′i(f −pR)−γ(x+x)′(f −pR) where
qi is agent i’s portfolio choice. Given the form of equilibrium price,
Wi − γW¯ = q′i(f − pR)− γ(x+ x¯)′(f − pR)
= (f − pR)′[qi − γC−1(Rp−D −Bf)]
= (f −Rp)′[qi + γC−1D + γC−1(B − I)Rp] + (f −Rp)′γC−1B(f − pR).
Then the expected utility in period 3 is
E[− exp(−ρ(Wi − γW ))|p, ηi] = −E[exp((f − pR)′G(f − pR) + (f − pR)′b)|p, ηi].
where G = −ργC−1B, b = −ρ[qi + γC−1D + γC−1(B − I)Rp].
By equation (17) and the definition of µˆi and Σ̂i, the problem of agent i
is to chooses qi to maximize
b′(µˆi −Rp) + (µˆi −Rp)′G(µˆi −Rp) + 1
2
[b+ 2G(µi −Rp)]′
× (I − 2Σ̂iG)−1Σ̂i[b+ 2G(µˆi −Rp)].
Differentiating the expression above w.r.t b yields the first order condition
µˆi −Rp+ (I − 2Σ̂iG)−1Σ̂i[b+ 2G(µˆi −Rp)] = 0.
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Then b = −Σ̂−1i (µˆi −Rp). By the definition of b,
qi =
Σ̂−1i (µˆi − pR)
ρ
− γ[C−1D + C−1(B − I)Rp]. (A.1)
The market clearing condition requires that
∫ 1
0
qidi = x+ x.
Substituting
E[f |p] = E[B−1(Rp−D − Cx)|p] = B−1(Rp−D)
and
Σp ≡ V ar[f |p] = σ2xB−1C(B−1C)′
into the market clearing condition and matching coefficients yields the solu-
tion of D, B and C. Let A = D+Cx¯, then we have the solution of A, B and
C.
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